

Anti-Islamists Savaged

In a recent Commentary I referred to the attacks on those protesting around our capital cities against extremist Islam and describing themselves as “Reclaim Australia”. Those attacking the Reclaim Australians were described in most media as being “anti-racist”. This despite the fact that Islamists come from different races, including English.

The following personal account sent from a participant who attended the “Reclaim Australia” rally in Melbourne on Saturday, 18 July 2015. This indicates that the media has not told the full story.

“I have been a hotelier and nightclub operator for most of my life and have witnessed a fair bit of biffa in my years. Nothing prepared me for what I was about to be confronted with at the Melbourne ‘Reclaim Australia’ rally. Arriving fashionably late at approximately 11:30 am, I approached the barriers at the southern end of Spring Street. The police directed me to go around the block to the Northern end. I followed another gentleman, in his sixties, who had an Australian flag protruding from his pocket. We both turned the corner, into little Bourke Street, where there were barriers, and quite a mob of the so called ‘anti racists’. Milk was flowing down the gutters, and further up was a stockpile of milk crates, with several people marked as ‘medics’ treating activists the police had just sprayed with capsicum spray.

The gentleman with the flag in his pocket, was suddenly accosted by some of the mob. He was hopelessly outnumbered and was being pushed around. The mob were trying to steal his flag, and eventually were successful, after assaulting him by punching and kicking him. Once they had the flag, they proceeded to tear it, throwing it on the ground and stomping on it. As he was trying to escape, the mob were surrounding him screaming obscenities and pushing and shoving him.

I made my way onto Spring Street, where there was an even larger mob, maybe 500 or 600 people, some with megaphones. At a guess, it would appear that 10 to 20 per cent of this mob had some sort of face covering. There were a few late comers or stragglers attempting to get through to the ‘Reclaim Australia’ section. It was futile. As soon as anyone in the mob identified a person as a Reclaimer, a large horde of 20 to 40 of the mob would rush to them, and in many incidents I witnessed, assault them, knock them to the ground, and kick them on the ground. It became a mob mentality. Anyone with an Australian flag had it stolen from them and was assaulted. Almost every assault I witnessed was by twenty or more onto one.

This mob was well organized. They had marked ‘medics’ attending to any of theirs who had been sprayed or injured. Crates of milk were stacked strategically around the place to wash the capsicum spray from the eyes and faces of anyone who got sprayed by the police. They also had people in their group with bags of gold glitter, which were thrown over anyone they identified as a Reclaimer. They were now ‘marked’ as enemy.

Towards the end three Reclaimers were trying to leave by the north end of Spring Street. They stayed together and pushed through the mob, who at the start seemed unwilling to take them on because there were three rather than one. The mob were screaming obscenities at them and verbally threatening them. The three Reclaimers turned and faced the mob of maybe 50 or more, and invited any of them if they felt like it to come at them. No one in the mob moved. There was quite a heated verbal exchange for a few minutes. The three Reclaimers started to retreat, at first backwards, and as they moved, the mob followed them. When the Reclaimers turned and started briskly walking the mob rushed them. They were attacked from behind and were no match, being so outnumbered. The police moved in and doused them all with spray.

The three Reclaimers were singled out by the police, cuffed and taken away. It was extraordinary, that none of the mob were arrested, given that they attacked the Reclaimers

who were retreating and one of the mob was stomping on the head of a Reclaimer who had been taken to ground. I was three or four metres from this incident when it happened.

It is a sad day for Australia, when a feral mob controls the streets with almost impunity and physically attack anyone else who does not share their twisted world view.”

The US/Iran Deal

An Iran Deal Distraction

Henry F. Cooper — NR July 20, 2015

<http://www.nationalreview.com/node/421367/print>

There are many things wrong with the deal with Iran that, at a minimum, paves the road for Iran to get nuclear weapons and deliver them to attack Israel and the United States. This remains the explicit goal of the Iranian mullahs and their followers, who greeted the deal with chants of “Death to Israel” and “Death to America.”

I could join the chorus recounting those many faults. But I prefer to emphasize something that is missing entirely from the debate: The mullahs and their followers may be able to achieve their goal with a capability they already have.

Iran launched a monkey into space on January 28, 2013 — almost 30 months ago. As then reported by Yeganeh Torbati in a Reuters article, this feat [entailed launching a satellite weighting 4,400 pounds](#) — much, much more than enough to carry a nuclear weapon.

The month before this monkey business, the Congressional Research Service published a report — [Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs](#) — that, among other things, described a new Iranian satellite launch site at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The site had been reported to be 80 percent complete in June 2012. Presumably, it can launch satellites southward over a wide swath of directions. Such a satellite could pass over the United States in its first orbit.

A launch over the South Polar regions would approach the United States from a direction that avoids our current ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems, which are focused on defending against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that approach the United from the north. In effect, we have left our back door open while working to lock the front door.

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This past February, Iran conducted its fourth satellite launch to the south, during national ceremonies marking the 36th anniversary of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This satellite was reported to weigh only 110 pounds and is in orbit at an altitude varying between 139 and 285 miles.

This range of altitudes fits for Iran to detonate a nuclear weapon over the United States and produce an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that would shut down the electric-power grid of the continental United States for an indefinite period. Within a year, 200 million Americans could perish from starvation, disease, and societal collapse, according to estimates of members of the Congressional EMP Commission.

Executing this existential threat is much simpler than delivering a nuclear weapon by an ICBM, because the nuclear weapon would be detonated above the atmosphere — no proven ability to reenter the atmosphere (with a warhead) is needed.

This range of altitudes fits for Iran to detonate (an EMP) nuclear weapon over the United States

Two points deserve emphasis.

First, Iran already may have access to nuclear weapons, either in its own right or through cooperation with its ally, nuclear-capable North Korea — which also launches its satellites over the South Polar regions and can exploit the same U.S. vulnerabilities.

And second, we should not permit this vulnerability to persist while being distracted by a debate about potential future Iranian capabilities.

In turn, two straightforward action items seem obvious.

First, we must deal with the EMP threat. The Department of Defense knows how; it has been protecting its key military systems against EMP effects for a half century — but it has not similarly been protecting the infrastructure upon which the survival of the American people depends. President Obama should knock heads until his lieutenants get their act together and address this deficiency.

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And second, we must defend against the threat from the south. We currently have no defense against the aforementioned satellites that approach us from over the South Polar regions, or against ballistic missiles launched from vessels in the Gulf of Mexico. The first might be addressed by empowering our missile-defense site at Vandenberg Air Force Base with sensors that track the threatening satellite. The second could be addressed by deploying on military bases around the Gulf the same Aegis Ashore BMD systems that we are building in Romania and Poland to protect Europe against Iranian ballistic missiles.

While the EMP threat can be handled entirely by unilateral U.S. actions, diplomacy can play a role in countering the satellite threat. There are legitimate, non-threatening reasons for Iran (or North Korea) to launch satellites. But they should assure us that such launches do not carry nuclear weapons. And these assurances must be verified with high confidence.

I recommend that the president make a unilateral declaration that the United States will shoot down any Iranian (or North Korean) satellite unless an inspection demonstrates that no nuclear payload is involved. His negotiators could work out acceptable details that would be consistent with those negotiated with the Soviet Union over 25 years ago.

Now that would be a treaty worth having.

— Henry F. Cooper was the director of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the acquisition executive of U.S. ballistic-missile defense systems, and chief negotiator at the Defense and Space Talks with the former Soviet Union.

Iran: a better deal needed

18 Jul 2015|[Colin Rubenstein](#)

<http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/iran-a-better-deal-needed/>

At the heart of the international effort to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons has been the knowledge and understanding that Iran is a dangerous, expansionist rogue country and a

leading state sponsor of terrorism that must be prevented from obtaining even the capability to produce the world's most dangerous weapons.

The newly unveiled Iran nuclear agreement represents an historic mistake for the simple reason that it has traded-and even the deal's crafters admit this-at best a temporary delay in Iran's drive towards nuclear weapons for permanent international legitimisation of Iran's nuclear program. It will also lead to a supercharging of Iran's economy and conventional military capabilities and a removal of all penalties for Iran's global terror activities, past and present.

This agreement lavishly rewards Iran for embarking on its illegal nuclear program, changes the balance of power strongly towards the Iranian bloc, and promotes Iranian hegemony in the Middle East despite the fact that its expansionist international agenda and repressive domestic policies persist.

This is a concern shared not only by Israel, threatened by Iranian proxies on its Gaza and Lebanese borders, but other countries in the region. Indeed, we can see Iran's 'handiwork' throughout the Middle East; whether through support of the murderous Assad regime in Syria, Shiite interests in Iraq or the Houthis in Yemen-and all this happening even under sanctions. Such Iranian terror sponsorship and military intervention is certain to increase exponentially from the \$150 billion windfall that Teheran is expected to reap from the lifting of sanctions as a result of this agreement.

When and why did the global objective to stop Iran acquiring nuclear weapons get downgraded to stop building a nuclear bomb for only the next 10-15 years? Alarming,ly, this agreement paves the way for Tehran to develop a nuclear weapons capability whether it follows the terms of the deal or not. If Iran decides to violate the deal in a selective and piecemeal fashion-not improbable given its track record of cheating-the contrived, 'managed' inspection scheme combined with vague, tardy compliance mechanisms, will make it extremely difficult to hold Iran accountable.

Western demands during negotiations for 'anywhere, anytime' inspections have been diluted in the final agreement to 'sometime, someplace' inspections that Iran will find easy to avoid. It'll take at least 24 days to force Iran to agree to a 'snap' inspection!

Meanwhile, the highly-touted 'snap-back sanctions' feature of the agreement that the US insisted would keep Iran wary of any violations has been exposed as a toothless gimmick. Not only would it not apply retroactively to contracts signed between now and the time the sanction is reimposed, but a UN Security Council resolution draft on the agreement being written with full US support would nullify all previous UN sanctions on Iran in 10 years-regardless of Iran's actions. To put it succinctly, after 10 years, it appears there will be no sanctions to 'snap back' to.

In terms of infrastructure, nothing is permanently scaled back, no nuclear sites shut down, and nothing actually dismantled yet Iran can advance certain aspects of their program. Significantly, any curbs on Iran's research and development of faster centrifuges are temporary. This means that breakout time to the enriched material for a bomb once the agreement concludes would almost certainly be measured in days or weeks, not months. Alarming,ly, the deal places no restrictions on Iran's intercontinental ballistic missile program-useful only as a delivery system for a nuclear warhead, and nothing else.

The end of the arms embargo of Iran will touch off a conventional arms race between Iran and the Gulf Sunni states, while Saudi Arabia has already vowed to procure nuclear weapons if Iran succeeds in developing them. Proponents argue it's the best possible deal that could be achieved claiming that there was no alternative, except war. Yet President Obama and

Secretary of State Kerry previously said that having no deal would be preferable to a bad deal. They are now in effect arguing that any deal by which Iran agrees to limit its nuclear activity in any way is by definition a 'good deal' because it is better than war or Iran simply 'racing' to a bomb.

In fact, no deal would have been infinitely better than the bad deal delivered. And good diplomatic deals are possible as President George W. Bush's agreement leading to the total dismantling of Libya's elaborate nuclear infrastructure in 2003 demonstrates. And one must recall that Iran did pause its nuclear activity in 2003 soon after the US invasion of Iraq. Yet with the credibility of a US military strike reduced as a result of President Obama's view-well understood in the region-that military action would be even worse than Iran's eventual acquisition of a nuclear capability, the potential dividends of coercive diplomacy have been squandered.

Indeed, simply renewing indefinitely the Geneva 2013 interim nuclear deal would have been preferable, because it would have kept the sanctions and arms embargo in place, maintaining pressure on Iran over time to abandon its costly nuclear program.

In Washington, all the Republican presidential contenders and informed Democratic and Republican lawmakers are trenchantly exposing the inherent flaws in this deal. Congress has the power to demand the White House strikes a better agreement by overriding a promised presidential veto and prevent the removal of sanctions that this deeply dangerous agreement depends upon.

These rightly troubled US lawmakers have an uphill battle to mobilise enough Congressional support to insist the White House renegotiates a better agreement that will help secure, rather than destabilise, regional and global affairs.

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